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ABSTRACT 
The destruction brought by World War II fashioned an intense fear of any instability in 
the international system. The primary result of this fear is the institution of the United Nations, 
which, in turn, has been compelled to undertake a number of state building and peace keeping 
operations. While the international community has seen success in these operations, many states 
continue to fail – for these states all variables should be on the table. Among the most 
underexplored variables in state failure is state geometry; for years, a select few political 
scientists have attempted to explore the relationship between the two, but with little success, 
primarily due to a lack of tools and proper datasets. This has changed rapidly with the rise of the 
information age; new data and new methods now allows us to build precipitously on the work of 
these scholars.  
In my paper, using the compactness equation developed by Lewis Fry Richardson for his 
influential book “The Statistics of Deadly Quarrels,” I seek to analyze how compactness, or the 
“circularity” of a state, and capital location have affected the number of days of insurgency in a 
state between the year of 1970 and 2013, which I treat as a proxy for instability. My research 
suggests that both state shape and capital location have little correlation with the amount of 
insurgency, while other geospatial variables like physical distance and size have much greater 
effects. Nevertheless, my research is only a preliminary inquiry; much more research is required 
to determine how state geometry not only effects the stability of a state, but to also ascertain how 
it may affect other variables like economics and political representation, in the hope can we build 
stronger, more prosperous, and more representative states. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Relentless politicians and news outlets desperate to fill a constant, completive news cycle 
have sold the Western publics the idea that the insurgencies of the late 20th and 21st centuries 
are unprecedented. While it is true that the global reach of insurgent organizations is novel, the 
concept of insurgency has plagued the state since its infancy. Akkad, located in the modern day 
Middle East during the late third millennium BC and widely considered the first empire, was 
fraught with uprisings until mountain peoples overran the beleaguered state. (Boot, Invisible 
Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present, 2012) The 
Western Roman Empire fought scores of peasant insurgents called “bagaudae” from the third 
century until it’s fall. (Minor, 1975) Insurgencies defined the French Revolutionary period and 
its successor, the Napoleonic era, which saw insurgencies succeed and redefine the European 
mainland. (Andress, 2015; Jones, 2015) Even today, insurgent groups like the loosely affiliated 
Patriot movement dot the landscape of the world’s only superpower, the United States. (Southern 
Poverty Law Center, 2010) 
Regardless, the purveyors of fear and the horrors of the First and Second World Wars has 
created help foster an intense fear of instability throughout the world. This fear of instability is so 
deeply imbedded in the collective psyche of the political elite in the post-World War era that the 
Charter of the United Nations begins with the following:  
“The Purposes of the United Nations are….to maintain international peace and security, and to 
that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring 
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of 
the peace” (United Nations, 1945) 
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In this spirit, the United Nations has undertaken an unprecedented number of state-building cases 
(often referred to as nation-building) campaigns; most of which have occurred in young, post-
colonial nation-states. (Dobbins, Jones, Crane, & Rathmell, 2005) 
 The UN has seen much success in its state-building efforts, with “seven out of eight 
societies left peaceful” and three out of four left democratic. (Ibid) Yet, for the many states that 
have fallen through the cracks and the other failing states, many of which are African states 
facing brutal insurgencies, all solutions should be on the table. (Ibid) Among these solutions set 
forward, specifically for Africa, is to redraw the borders set by their colonial heritage. Several 
scholars have argued that there is little hope for long-lasting legitimacy for many African states 
who continue to use the colonial borders as political borders. 
 For example, one scholar, Mutua, (1995) who, in “Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A 
Moral and Legal Inquiry,” argues that the “crude and thoughtless” borders constructed by 
Europeans during the colonial era are a strong source of the significant conflict experienced on 
the continent. The Institute for Security Studies (2012), a think tank for African security, 
similarly, attacks Africa’s colonial heritage and its defense of the status quo as reason for its lack 
of state control. In a review on African borders and their effects on conflict in the region, among 
other things, they ascribe the inability to institutionalize government efficiency, consolidate as a 
nation, and various state terror and insurgencies to the border situation in the area. Further, 
Englebert (2015), in his analysis of the African economy, places significant blame in the pre-
colonial state structures that the continent inherited and maintained. These academics and their 
works all hint at a similar thread - they all maintain that the political structure of post-colonial 
Africa is malformed and needs to be thoroughly redefined for Africa to become relatively 
functional continent. 
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 This serves as the backdrop for my discussion on the role of border geometry and state 
stability. Political scientists have written extensively on the role of other physical attributes of 
states, such as geography, and its role in insurgencies, but comparatively little has been written 
on the role of border geometry and its effects on insurgency. If we are going to have a 
conversation about producing more stable states and a populace that feels that it is better 
represented at home and aboard, all variables should be on the table. My contribution to this 
research is simple, I wish to examine the effects of state geometry on the incidence of intrastate 
strife.  
 Specifically, I will be examining if and how a state’s compactness and capital location 
affect the frequency of days of insurgency between the years of 1970-2013. For this paper, I 
define compactness as the degree to which a geographic figure’s boundaries are uniformly 
distributed from the geographic centroid. Simply put, a perfect circle, whose perimeter is always 
equidistant from the centroid, is perfectly compact, whereas a line that stretches infinitely is the 
most incompact figure; furthermore, we will explore the role of capital placement in non-
compact states and discuss if more central capital placement can mitigate any effects that 
noncompactness may have on a state. 
 
REVIEW 
DEFINITIONS 
 The core of this paper revolves around two concepts, the state and the violent challenges 
to the state known as insurgency. Thus, to lay the foundation for this paper, we must define the 
two. The fierce discussion around how to define these concepts is both a testament to Political 
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Scientists and somewhat unfortunate in the fact that the diverse definitions have made analysis 
both complicated and difficult to compare. Thus, it is imperative that we have a thoughtful yet 
brief discussion regarding the literature on the definitions to properly reinforce the foundations 
of this paper. 
The two most prominent definitions among Political Scientists are furnished by the 
influential sociologist Max Weber and the 1933 Montevideo Convention. Weber (1919) termed 
the state as a “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory.” Legitimacy of the state, for Weber, is derived 
from one of three sources: a charisma of a leader who demonstrates that he can lead with 
some extraordinary quality, the tradition of the people, or a system of laws. (Ibid) Beyond 
Weber, our second prominent definition was constructed at the Montevideo Convention 
(1933), which established that “The state as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and 
capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”  
 These two definitions are appreciable in tandem; with Weber’s definition, we have an 
idea of how a state should act and, with the Montevideo criteria, we have an idea of how a 
state should appear. Ultimately, this paper will carefully adhere to these guidelines but, 
again, neither of these are universally accepted and, thus, the political map of the world 
varies dramatically by region.  For example, the United States is among the, approximately, 100 
of the 193 United Nations member states have recognized that Kosovo is sovereign state; 
however, the UN itself does not recognize Kosovo, largely due to the Russian and Chinese 
presence on the United Nations Security Council. (United States Department of State, 2016; 
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United Nations, 2009) Examples of divergences in policy are numerous, the among the most 
notable examples being the aforementioned Kosovo situation, the dispute between Palestine and 
Israel over Palestine, India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir, and the People’s Republic of 
China and the Republic of China over China. (National Geographic, 2014; Blumenthal, 2016) 
Therefore any research, including my own, will be biased by the political world the data is living 
in. 
 Similarly, insurgency has a variety of competing definitions, although none are 
particularly well-established; this is rather unsurprising given the relative novelty of insurgent 
studies. To begin, the latest version of the United State Department of Defense’s (2016) 
“Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” defines insurgency as  
“the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a 
region. “ 
 
I disagree with this definition on one key point; the definition does not emphasize that insurgents 
are non-state actors challenging state actors for political control of regions where the state actor 
is the legitimate possessor. To illustrate the problems this creates, we can examine the situation 
in Iraq; the insurgency the Islamic State (IS) is not seen as the legitimate government of the 
region it controls in the Middle East, yet it does control it. Therefore, by the Department of 
Defense definition, the Iraqi government, which is retaking control of the Iraqi regions currently 
controlled by IS, could be considered an insurgency itself.  
On the other hand, it does correctly assert that insurgent are trying to “seize, nullify, or 
challenge political control of a region.” Many other definitions are often too precise in their 
definitions when considering what insurgencies are trying to accomplish.  Among these is 
Hayden who writes  
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“Insurgency is best defined as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow or destruction of a 
constituted government through the use of subversion, espionage, terrorism and armed conflict.” 
(ProCon.org, 2008) 
 
Hayden’s definition would exclude separatist insurgencies, like those of the Kurds in Iraq, Iran, 
Turkey and Syria, who do not seek to overthrow or destroy a government, but rather carve out a 
legitimate state from an existing state. Additionally, his addition of “and” indicates that 
insurgency needs to include all those ingredients - this is not true. During the American 
Revolution, while some American terrorist groups did exist, neither the Continental Congress nor 
the Continental Army ever used terrorism as a tactic. 
In Invisible Armies, which is the source of the insurgency data for this paper, scholar Max 
Boot (2012) defines insurgents as an irregular militia that uses guerilla warfare and/or terrorism 
as tactics to fight a state actor. Boot never names a goal for the insurgents and his definition is 
better for that; the goals of insurgents are innumerable, ranging from seeking no state control 
whatsoever (Anarchists) to gaining total state control (Communists). His definition, in contrast to 
the others, also excludes subversion, best defined as “all illegal measures short of the use of 
armed force taken by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing the 
country at the time, or to force them to do things they do not want to do”; of course, subversion 
is not irrelevant to insurgents, but it also, alone, does not make an insurgency. To illustrate, 
would we consider the numerous underground Baltic newspapers and subversive political groups 
as insurgencies during the Soviet Era? Conversely, would a theoretical insurgency that focused 
purely on armed confrontations without subversion, not be considered an insurgency? In both 
cases, I would argue no and, as a result, I would argue that adding subversion to the definition of 
insurgency is worthless. 
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More concisely, the definition of insurgency for this paper is:  
“a violent resistance organized by a non-state actor against the legitimate government of 
a state” 
 
THE ELEMENTS: PEOPLE 
As I have noted, these organized groups are not new, but their entrance into the collective 
psyche of the Political Science sphere is; largely scaling with increasing frequency, operational 
capability, visibility of insurgencies. Recently, this has been enhanced by the availability of 
large, comprehensive dataset, the rise of novel methods, and the desperation of the American 
situations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. However, before we begin discussing 
insurgencies as an organism, we must look at the individuals that compose insurgencies with a 
careful eye, designed to try to avoid the biases that often plague even high level discussions of 
insurgencies. As Steven Metz (2012) writes “Americans face a mental barrier of our own 
creation…we are a quintessentially political people, but it is politics of a peculiar type, born of 
the European Enlightenment.”  
In his article “Psychology of Participation in Insurgency,” Metz (Ibid) categorizes 
insurgents into six “ideal types”: survivors, who join insurgencies because the life of insurgent 
offers them a safer life; the lost, who join for a more structured and meaningful life; the thugs 
and the ambitious; who are looking for personal gain; the aggrieved; who seek revenge on an 
unjust system; and the idealists, who, like the aggrieved, seek justice, but also seek to build a 
new political system in the ashes of the old. Of these, the two key cogs are the aggrieved and the 
idealists. Metz pens that “Most insurgents do not seek a better political system but rather one that 
empowers them or, at least, leaves them alone.” Simply put, most insurgents are unsatisfied with 
Ryan Hall Shapes and Noise 9 
the status quo, but not in a grandiose way; they are not politicians; therefore, they are not looking 
to fulfill unmet political needs, rather unmet psychological needs.  
To better understand how insurgencies grow, it is best to cluster these ideal types into 
three groups, which we will call the needy (the survivors and the lost), who are attempting to 
meet unmet psychological and physical needs, the warriors (the ambitious and the thugs), who 
seek fight for personal gains, and the soldiers (the aggrieved and the idealists), who are fighting 
to avenge and right perceived wrongs. In states where violence is a norm, the barriers to joining 
an insurgent group is relatively low and a majority of an insurgent group will be the needy and 
the warriors, groups that are desperate to achieve their personal goals, but are, in large part, not 
desperate enough to break norms in the process. On the other hand, in cultures where normative 
behavior shuns violence and injustice, the majority of an insurgent group will be the soldiers, 
who have a normative reason for their fight – grievance. (Ibid) 
 However, it is important to note that these are ideal types and that there is much fluidly 
between the Metz’s groups; an insurgent can exist in multiple groups at simultaneously. For 
example, one insurgent, Zaydan al-Jibouri, justified his tribe’s decision to join the Islamic State 
by claiming that “the Sunni community has two options, fight against ISIS and allow Iran and its 
militias to rule us, or do the opposite. We chose ISIS for only one reason. ISIS only kills you. 
The Iraqi government kills you and rapes your women.” (Ignatius, 2014) In his words, you can 
find both the mentality of person who is a survivor and a person who has legitimate grievances 
with the government of Iraq. Interestingly, based on this quote alone, we can deduce that both 
ideal types are crucial for his participation; if al-Jibouri felt that ISIS only granted him access to 
one of these concepts, it is likely that al-Jibouri would not a participant at all.  
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With similarity, Arie W. Kruglanski (2014) writes that “violent extremism” comes two 
basic human needs – the need for cognitive closure and personal significance. Cognitive closure 
is the “the feeling of certainty;” a student would feel the need for cognitive closure when waiting 
for the results of an exam, a professor when offering a paper for peer review, or an author when 
submitting a book to a publisher. (Lange, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2011) The political and social 
uncertainties that are ever present in the Sunni Northwestern Iraq have created an atmosphere 
where a stunning lack of cognitive closure is the norm. (Kruglanski, 2014) Further, the rampant 
unemployment and lack of opportunity in the wider Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Sub-
Saharan Africa have created recruiting hotbeds for various insurgent groups; the feeling that, 
through the work of insurgent groups like the Islamic State, a poor disaffected Sunni can become 
a hero is enticing and adds an element of intrigue to a seemingly meaningless existence. (Ahmed, 
Guillaume, & Furceri, 2012; Kruglanski, 2014) 
The threads of Metz and Kruglanski complement each other well. If you look over the 
history of insurgency, from the Akkadians to the Cubans, you can find these base elements have 
similar bonds. Importantly, we must understand that the chemical insurgency is not a monolith 
and is largely formed by the disaffected, whom fight both because they feel they must and, for 
some, because it’s the only thing they have. Although these are led and legitimized by the 
“Idealists,” the Mao Tse-tungs, Che Guevaras, and Osama Bin Ladens, the impressionable 
leaders who grant insurgencies the ideologies that “unify, inspire, explain why the existing 
system is unjust or illegitimate, and rationalize the use of violence to alter or overthrow the 
existing system,” insurgencies are rarely largely composed of these types.  (Metz & Millen, 
2004) 
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THE CHEMICAL: INSURGENCY  
Most insurgencies typically arise out of three situations: grievances and political 
instability, ethnic/religious tensions, and, finally, greed and poverty; the two former are typically 
dominated by our “soldiers” and the latter is dominated by the “warriors,” with the “needy” 
interspersed between the three. In their opening phases, organizations, to be viable, typically 
need to achieve two goals – first and foremost, maintaining operational security and, after, 
carrying out attacks. (Lewis, 2012; Frisch, 2011) In a case study of insurgent groups in Uganda, 
it was found that operational security was the determining factor for failure and success of 
insurgencies; states that had difficulty policing regions beyond their capital and situations where 
citizens were more likely to cooperate with the government often led to catastrophic outcomes 
for these young insurgencies or “proto-insurgencies.” (Lewis, 2012) 
Naturally, initial conditions among a region’s populace are important for operational 
security. Certain demographic climates can naturally enhance operational security; in Uganda, it 
was found that ethnically homogeneous societies were conducive to maintaining insurgencies 
than those that were more homogeneous. (Ibid) For the insurgencies in homogenous populations, 
the battle to prevent government penetration into these in-groups becomes the war; once the 
government achieves even cursory infiltration, even the most accomplished groups are suspect. 
For instance, the Irgun, a Jewish insurgency who was on the front lines of the Jewish quest for 
Israel in the British mandate, was reduced to a shell of its former self when the Hagenah, a 
moderate Jewish group, decided that it would cooperate with the British. (Byman, 2007) In a 
case study of proto-insurgencies, it was found that in-group was “perhaps the best and most 
efficient way to prevent proto-insurgents from gaining ground.” (Ibid) 
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Yet these are still proto-insurgencies, for these small groups to gain the size and 
capability of an insurgency that can truly challenge the government, they need to achieve four 
goals beyond operational security; they must carve out a political identity that is relevant, have 
an identity that is popular beyond the “proto-insurgents,” they must become the dominant 
challenger to their government by superseding other rival groups, and finally, they must obtain a 
physical sanctuary from the opposing state. (Ibid) In “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies” Daniel 
Byman (2007) argues that violence is the primary mode by which an emerging insurgency can 
accomplish every task besides the last. Among other things, violence encourages media 
attention, support in the citizenry, and all reduces confidence in the government and moderates; 
thus, the calculations behind the use of violence and, most importantly, the government reactions 
to the use of violence are the most important factors beyond operational security. (Ibid) 
Once a proto-insurgency becomes an insurgency, an entire host of new bureaucratic 
issues arise. To be successful insurgencies must, typically, be organizationally sound, act 
quickly, obtain some measure of state sponsorship, and use terrain effectively. Paul Staniland 
(2013), in “Insurgent Organization and State-Armed Group Relations,” identifies four types of 
insurgent organizational structures: “Integrated groups” are the most effective – they have 
exceptional central command and deep control over their local units, “vanguard groups” have an 
exceptional central command but weak local control, “parochial groups” are composed of 
powerful local factions, “fragmented groups” are the least effective - they lack both exceptional 
central command and local control. These organizational structures are not intentionally 
implemented, rather, they are, according to Staniland (Ibid), “determined by the structure of 
prewar political networks.” 
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Like Metz’s ideal types, these structures are not explicitly chosen, they are determined by 
the structures of political networks prior to the start of the insurgency, and they can be fluid 
throughout the length of a conflict. On the first point, Staniland argues that “political parties, 
religious associations, student networks, and tribal ties, for instance, are often the underpinning 
of new insurgencies. These social bases are usually nonviolent and not built for war. Insurgents 
go to war with the networks they have, creating new organizational structures by mobilizing the 
ties of information, obligation, and trust they have access to it.” To slightly expand on 
Staniland’s assertion, the Tamil Tigers, the Taliban, and Boko Haram are all effective 
insurgencies that grew out of non-violent organizations and continued to nurture that structure, 
rather than risk their movement rebuilding their organization. (Richards, 2014; Stanford 
University, 2016; BBC News, 2016) 
However, these groups had the advantage of having exceptional horizontal and vertical 
links prior to insurgency, which is important for forming an integrated insurgent organization. I 
contend that any insurgent organizations that are not integrated are so because the structure and 
weaknesses of vanguard and parochial organizations are not readily apparent; these groups are 
often one or two dramatically events from fragmentation (a surgical strike on leadership or a 
political in-fight for instance). For those who do understand the weaknesses of their organization, 
reform is often dismissed because it could jeopardize the entire movement, as Che’s reform of 
the Congolese Simba insurgency did, and because vanguard and parochial organizations can still 
win, albeit with fewer roads to victory, as the parochial Afghan mujahedeen did in Soviet-era 
Afghanistan and the Nicaraguan Democratic Force did in Nicaragua during the Nicaraguan 
resistance. (Guevara, 2001; Malici, 2008; Long, 1986) 
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Beyond organizational structure, insurgencies, if they wish to best a state, must act quick. 
In the RAND monograph “How Insurgencies End,” Ben Connable and Martin Libicki (2010), in 
an analysis of 89 cases, discovered that insurgencies cannot win by simply surviving and, by 
extension an insurgency’s chance of winning may decrease over time. Thus, insurgencies must 
be prepared to strike at the cores of state power quickly and effectively; the Free Syrian Army, 
currently embroiled in the Syrian Civil War, is a prime example of this. In the early stages of the 
war, FSA threatened Damascus and held significant parts of Aleppo, however, by November 
2016, it was questionable that the FSA was still active at all, let alone an effective fighting force, 
thoroughly decimated by years of political infighting and desertions. (Associated Press, 2016; 
Banco, 2015; Fisk, 2015) 
 Moreover, Connable and Libicki (2010) found that obtaining and maintaining state 
sponsorship, meaning the “direct or indirect support provided to an insurgency by a nation-
state,” is absolutely crucial for maintaining an insurgency and achieving victory. When 
insurgencies benefitted from state sponsorship they won at 2 to 1 ratio, whereas when 
insurgencies lost sponsorship, they lost at a 1 to 4 ratio. Further, the loss of state sponsorship 
often coincides with the loss of an insurgency’s sanctuary, which most often takes the form of “a 
secure base area within which an insurgent group is able to organize the politico-military 
infrastructure needed to support its activities.” These sanctuaries are often located within a state 
sponsor’s territory and, as Connable and Libicki discovered, insurgencies “rarely survive or 
succeed without some kind of sanctuary.” (Ibid) 
Regardless of whether the sanctuary is located within the borders of a state sponsor, most 
insurgencies, if not all, require one; if not within the borders of the opposing state, it is within a 
“liberated zone” in the territory of the opposing state; naturally secluded from the enemy by 
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protective terrain – mountains, swamps, harsh vegetation, and so on. (Connable & Libicki, 2010) 
Moreover, sanctuaries need to be within a manageable distance of major political influence, 
which alleviates costs and allows insurgents to strike quickly. Because of this, and for insurgent 
morale, it is preferable that sanctuaries be located within a liberated zone. (ibid) 
Finally, insurgents must be an effective fighting force. Typically, insurgents are inferior 
in terms of skill, materiel, and numbers, thus, effective use of terrain is paramount. Stephen 
Biddle (2005), in his well-known book “Military Power,” claims that success in the modern era 
of combat is highly dependent on the use of geography in modern war. Biddle writes that when 
cover and concealment, among other factors, are used effectively, the technological advantages 
of the state is dampened; he offers a multitude of example to prove his thesis, most notably the 
tactics and failures of the Taliban in Afghanistan against Coalition forces during the early stage 
of the War in Afghanistan vis-à-vis its more recent success using the aforementioned principles. 
In addition, in the aforementioned “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” RAND scholar Daniel 
Byman (2007) writes that “governments have trouble implementing control when the terrain 
makes movement difficult and aids concealment,” Further analysis from the RAND Corporation 
found that “terrain allowed insurgents to avoid/overcome [counterinsurgent] force firepower or 
vehicle advantages.” (Paul, Clarke, Grill, & Dunigan, 2013) 
STATE GEOMETRY: AN UNDEREXPLORED FACTOR 
However, while much has been penned on the relationship of state geography and 
insurgency, comparative little has been written on state geometry and insurgency. Nevertheless, 
one scholar, Lewis Fry Richardson, could be considered a pioneer in the field. For his book, the 
ground-breaking Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, Richardson (1961) wrote an appendix “The 
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Problem of Contiguity,” which first appeared, posthumously, in the fourth volume of the 
“Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research.” In “Problems,” Richardson divides the 
world into groups of equal populations located within boundaries have “homoplaty” or are as 
“compact” as possible. 
The appendix was most noted for containing Richardson’s compactness equation, which 
has found a variety of uses within the academic community; Richardson himself used it in an 
attempt to theorize that states looked to obtain geographical compactness; so that their territory 
might be easier to defend. (ibid) Unfortunately, Richardson’s work was seriously hamstrung by 
the poor cartographic equipment available and the lack of a standard for measuring often 
incredibly complex borders at the time, a phenomenon we will discuss more in-depth later. 
(Richardson, 1961; Diehl, 1999) Nonetheless, even after better standards and tools became 
available, relatively few Social Scientists explored Richardson’s work on compactness; even 
fewer, if any, explored it in an international context or in regards to the stability of state systems. 
This is the gap we are looking to bridge – we are seeking to explore the effects, if any, of the 
variable of compactness in the internal stability of state systems, specifically in the context of 
insurgency.  
Why compactness? Let’s theorize two states with the social and political situations. One 
of our states has the same border geometry and capital location as Malawi while the other has the 
same as Nicaragua. Malawi and Nicaragua have, roughly, similar areas, with Malawi clocking in 
at about 118,000 km2 and the slightly larger Nicaragua hosting approximately 128,000 km2. 
However, assuming our states maintain the same capital, due to state geometry, the farthest 
border from the Nicaraguan capital of Managua, despite being less centrally located, is only, 
approximately 460km, while the farthest border of Malawi exists 520km from Lilongwe, the 
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Malawian capital. Why does this matter? First, the work of scholars Ades and Glaeser (1995), 
among others, reveal that “spatial proximity to power increases political influence;” thus, as 
states become less compact and more elongated, who live in the borderlands of that state become 
less effective politically, assuming a one to one ratio vis-à-vis a compact state with similar area. 
Among the select few Political Scientists that applied Richardson’s work on compactness 
to states is Vanzo (1999), who uses case studies of both World War 2-era Germany and post-
independence Israel to effectively argue that compactness is often a goal of many states: though 
few other scholars, if any, have looked to build on this work. Beyond Vanzo, academics have 
often circled Richardson’s compactness wagon, so to speak. Among these academics is Halvard 
Buhaug, who, with Rød (2006), divided Africa into a grid of 100x100km cells (a technique 
pioneered by Richardson) because “the intensity” of “popular explanations of why and where 
civil wars occur…varies geographically with states.” In this analysis, Buhaug and Rød find that, 
in African conflicts, distance from the capital is positively associated with risk of separatist war 
and that distance to border, expectedly, shows a negative, but not strong correlation “ In other 
research, Buhaug, with Gates and Lujala (2009), finds that duration of conflict is positively 
associated with distance from the capital; even more so than “conflicts located in rough terrain,” 
which his research leads him to believe is not actually supported by empirical evidence. Finally, 
in separate research, Buhaug and Gates (2002) find that “conflict zones that abut an international 
border will tend to be larger than conflict zones that do not.” 
Somewhat similar to Buhaug, David Galula (1964) argues that larger countries and 
border regions are more difficult to control and adds that countries that are easy to 
compartmentalize are easier to control. Given this, on the surface, one might believe that Galala 
believes that compact nations are the least friendly to the counterinsurgents, but Galala notes that 
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the barriers of compartmentalization must be hard barriers, not forests, swamps, or, most 
importantly, borders, since these obstacles, in fact, help most insurgents. To him, the French 
counterinsurgency against the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria is a prime example of 
how difficult it is guard long borders against insurgent forces. It took a massive French military 
advantage plus a force of over 150,000 Muslims to secure the Algerian border, but comparatively 
little to cut off the coast from pro-FLN smugglers, 
 
To Buhaug and Galala, Richard A. Griggs (2000) adds 
that countries with elongated borders are more difficult and 
expensive to defend against illegal border activity and, by 
extension, insurgency. He offers up Malawi (see Figure 1) as 
an example, a state whose “porous borders and location have 
made it a site of continuous refugee flows.” Simply put, states 
with high ratios of border areas to regular area will have a 
much more difficult time defending said border areas. Ultimately, Griggs writes that there is “a 
deeper need for… more scientific attention to boundaries” and that states, especially in south 
Africa, are avoiding this due to their own want of “power and sovereignty.” To compensate for 
this, he asks for the discussion on borders to be moved from politicians to geospatial political 
scientists. 
 Jordan Branch (2016) agrees, writing that “territorial shape has been an underexamined 
aspect of territorial disputes, claims, and rights.” He argues that the international community 
often divides territory consistently, not only because it’s political efficient but because it feels 
right.  Decision makers are therefore directing empirical studies and actions on territory towards 
Figure 1: Malawi 
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solutions are not only practical, but towards solutions that just feel right. Furthermore, Branch 
does directly mention Vanzo and cautions academics on over-focusing on state shape because 
“defense, for example, has as much to do with other aspects of the ‘shape’ of a state, such as 
geography or terrain, as it does with geometric compactness.” I, cautiously, agree with Branch on 
this point, the more likely scenario is that terrain and geographic features mean more than 
geometric shape. History is littered with inferior forces who use terrain to overcome superior 
forces. In fact, as evidenced by word of Biddle and Byman above, many scholars contend that 
the use of terrain and geography is often the decisive factor in warfare.  
Nevertheless, it’s best to take time to explore the discussion that Branch is putting forth; 
once again, I (and, I assume, Vanzo) do not dispute that, given the body of literature surrounding 
the geography issue, geography is important, but it should be apparent that the issue of 
geography should not be the only political calculus a state should make. For example, a state 
should carefully consider annexing many foreign nationals and their lands to gain a favorable, 
geographically advantageous border. In 1975, Indonesia invaded annexed the eastern half of 
Timor Island; the move put the entire island under Indonesian control and, as a result, 
geographically strengthened Indonesian defenses against invasion by pushing Indonesian borders 
to the ocean; thus, denying an expanding, Timor-allied China a more favorable border area to 
attack. However, the move was met with widespread condemnation and an unmanageable 
insurgency that lasted until East Timor and Indonesia split in 1999. (Freedom House, 1999) 
Another example is the Israeli occupation of the Sinai after the Six Days’ War in 1967. 
The Israelis, looking to gain strategic depth against the Egyptians, occupied the entire Sinai 
Peninsula, constructing a massive, expensive defense barrier, named the Bar-Lev Line, along the 
Suez, a seemingly natural defense barrier against Egyptian tanks. Yet, by taking this territory, 
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authors Ambrose and Brinkley (1997) note, the “Israeli Army....had overextended itself...by 
occupying all of the Sinai up to the east bank of the Suez.” This hints that, despite the favorable 
geographic position, Israel could not effectively administer the territory, negating much of the 
strategic depth they perceived as important. 
 When the Egyptians launched a surprise attack in 1973, the Bar-Lev virtually melted and 
the Israelis were dealt a moral defeat that redefined Egyptian-Israeli relations. (Tucker & 
Roberts, 2008) In this case, it’s clear that Israel had simply overestimated the worth of 
geography in its political calculations and underestimated the ability of other factors to 
undermine the usefulness of natural barriers. It should also be noted that, per Vanzo (1999), the 
Sinai occupation made Israel much more compact, but this is besides my ultimate point; my goal 
using these examples is to demonstrate that other factors, including, perhaps, state geometry, can 
mitigate any gains that geographic advantages may bring and states should be cautious about 
over relying on “geography or terrain.” 
The Israel example also produces a second point: can the location of the capital city 
affect the efficiency of the less compact states? A capital in more central location of the state, 
perhaps just north of the then-former border, may have given Israel a better opportunity to repel 
the Egyptians. Why? Perhaps it may have given Israeli politicians and tacticians greater 
knowledge of the terrain and local Bedouins. For instance, Jean Gottman (1961) writes that since 
World War I, several states have relocated their capitals and several these relocations have been 
to an inland, central location. He also writes that capitals have often served as a “pluralistic 
hinge, articulating the various sections, cross sections, networks and groups of interests within a 
territory.” World-class capital cities like Washington, Tokyo, Stockholm, Ottawa, and Brussels 
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all fall into this category; primary as sociocultural hinges, intended to link sections of a state that 
has “different cultures and social structures.”  
Thus, it should be no surprise that autocratic regimes looking to dominate states and 
insulate themselves from dissention move their capitals to relatively remote areas. A World Bank 
report found “robust evidence that isolated capitals are indeed associated with misgovernance, 
controlling for a number of variables that are reckoned to correlate with quality of governance 
and isolation of the capital, and using different ways of measuring these concepts.” (Campante, 
Do, & Guimaraes, 2014) In their report they define an isolated capital, in their definition, is a 
capital that exists relatively far from the spatial center of a state’s population; this, of course, 
concurs with the work of Ades and Glaeser (1995), who write that “spatial proximity to power 
increases political influence;” and Buhaug’s discovery that insurgencies are more robust near the 
border. (Buhaug & Rød, Local determinants of African civil wars, 1970-2001, 2006) 
 Ades and Glaeser’s assertion provides us with a link to insurgents; as we have discussed, 
a running thread among insurgents is their feeling of powerless in the government. In Chechnya, 
a federal subject of Russia, insurgents don’t sympathize with radical ideologies, but rather 
“because they feel powerless to do anything else in to violations committed against them and 
their loved ones.” (Schaefer, 2010) Unsurprisingly, the Chechnya is located almost two thousand 
kilometers from the Russian capital of Moscow. Similarly, during his time in Doda, a town in 
Jammu and Kashmir, Harjeet Singh (1999) discovers that a rural population supports insurgents 
when are neglected by the government and feel powerless to control their lives. This is so 
prevalent a theme that many counterinsurgency (COIN) handbooks see empowering citizen as an 
exceedingly crucial step in COIN strategy. 
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THEORY 
 To undercover the relationships between insurgencies and state morphology, we will 
begin with the first of two hypotheses: 
H1: States that are less compact will experience more days of insurgency than states that are 
more compact. 
 Producing states that can effectively administer force within their borders is key to 
producing viable states. Non-compactness creates challenges that can severely impede states, 
especially in the third world, where resources are often scarce. Let’s return to Malawi as an 
example of a noncompact state; again, Malawi is approximately 120,000 km^2, but nearly 
900km from its northernmost end to its southernmost end. For comparison, Nicaragua is over 
10,000km^2 larger than Malawi (approximately 130,000 km^2) but no two places are more than 
500km apart due to its compact design. This means that Nicaragua can move material and 
materiel within its borders with greater efficiency and much lower cost, despite its larger size.  
Even when controlling for the shorter distances of Malawi’s East-West border, 
transportation of material is still inefficient. To illustrate this in a simple manner, let’s take a 
circle, a perfectly compact shape and compare it to an uncompact ellipse. For this example, both 
shapes have an area of π, thus our circle has axes of 2 our ellipse has a major axis of 4 and a 
minor axis of 1. Considering this, our ellipsis would have an average distance to the “border” 
that is twice as large as a circle’s average distance to the border.  Of course, examples within our 
state system are infinitely more complicated, but this translates the added cost of a noncompact 
state rather well. This seems trivial to a degree, but recalling the work of Buhaug (2006) tells us 
that insurgencies are commonly found in the borderlands of states, far from the eyes of the 
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polity; thus, nations like Malawi may be more likely to be facing insurgent forces at the far edges 
of its territory. 
In our literature review, we noted that Buhaug and Rod (2006) found that separatist war 
is positively correlated with distance from the capital of a state. This, according Buhaug, not only 
makes insurgency more likely in non-compact states, it also means, between states of equal 
resources and size, that non-compact have equal resources to deal with higher rates of 
insurgency. This is a crucial piece of political calculus in state-building exercise; states that are 
undergoing state-building are fragile and particularly sensitive to insurgency. Additionally, the 
organization or state overseeing the state-building operation would want to complete the 
operation with the utmost efficiency.  
 If I find this hypothesis has merit, then compactness could be an exceptional variable in 
the state-building equation. State-building operations, to this point, have been overwhelmingly 
focused on maintaining the status quo in relation to border fixity. Still, if non-compact states are 
prone to high amounts of insurgency and, by extension, an increased rate of failure, then the 
international community would be required to place a greater emphasis on borders and their 
permutations, both for domestic and international security. Indeed, nation-states are hesitant to 
fracture states due out of fear that it may undermine their sovereignty, however, if 
noncompactness significantly increase state failure, they may have no choice. On the other hand, 
if this hypothesis doesn’t have merit, then states need to understand that their quests for 
compactness, as noted by Vanzo, is unlikely to produce the outcomes they are seeking. 
My second hypothesis is: 
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H2: If the source of power in a state, the political capital, is far from the centroid of the state, 
then it negates the strengths of a compact state. 
As research from the World Bank noted, capitals that are geographically isolated are less 
sensitive to the will of the people. (Campante, Do, & Guimaraes, 2014) There is an argument to 
be made that a capital should be placed at the center of population in the state, providing 
somewhat equal access to all citizens, however, moving the capital as the center of population 
moves is untenable for many states. Also, it makes the symbols of the state less opaque and, by 
extension, reduces the visibility and traditions of the state. Moreover, if we take the capital to be 
a source of a power gradient that emanates from the capital, as the World Bank report suggests, 
then those who reside at the edge of the gradient would be even more disenfranchised if they 
were part of a government that followed the center of population rather than the geographic 
centroid. (Ibid) 
A counter to this reasoning would be that large populations could exist at the state border 
and keeping those populations “in check” would be much more crucial for a government than 
those in relatively remote areas. However, the Army’s Strategic Studies Institute notes that 
economic grievances are key in many insurgencies and, further, a lack of proper transportation, 
which is the norm for many rural border regions, is a crucial factor in addressing the lack of 
economic opportunity. Additionally, insurgencies can thrive in areas in areas with little 
population provided they are sufficiently remote. Regardless of distance, large population centers 
are much more likely to be connected via high speed transit to the capital region of any state, 
therefore the effects of the “gradient” are felt much less in these areas. Finally, the economic cost 
of building roads and other transportation infrastructure to the remote borderlands is much less 
with a capital in the geographic centroid of the state. 
Ryan Hall Shapes and Noise 25 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Richardson’s compactness equation is as follows: 
2√𝜋𝐴/𝑃 
In this equation, A translates to area, and P substitutes for perimeter. In the breakdown of 
this equation, scholar Paul Francis Diehl provides two of the chief advantages of Richardson’s 
method. First, according to Diehl (1999), “Richardson’s formula has the advantage of 
mathematically controlling for size,” second, Richardson’s equation provides us with an 
incredibly straightforward value between 0 and 1; 0 gives us my an imperfectly compact line and 
1 would signify a perfectly round circle. Given this simply and the extreme malleability of the 
equation, along with its long history with in the academic community, we be using Richardson’s 
equation to determine the compactness of each state.  
However, measuring the length of boundaries is notoriously difficult and, when it comes 
to coastlines, impossible to obtain an exact number; Lewis Fry Richardson himself noted this 
while attempting to survey the Britain coast during the 1950s. In 1967, Richardson’s research 
would lead B.B. Mandelbrot to write about the “self-similarity and fractional dimensions” of 
coastlines, research that would later lead to creation of the field of fractal geometry. In his work, 
he writes that “geographical curves…can be considered superpositions of features of widely 
scattered characteristic sizes; as even finer features are taken into account, the total measured 
length increases, and there is usually no clear-cut gap or crossover, between the realm of 
geography and details with which geography need not be concerned.” (Mandelbrot, 1967) 
 Thus, many states have wildly different measurements of their coastline, which is often 
assumed to be accurate and aggregated by others, most notably the CIA World Factbook. 
Ryan Hall Shapes and Noise 26 
Therefore, the base of my research, the boundary line calculations of states, needed to be 
compiled with similar standards and scrutiny. Thus, I chose the March 2013 version of the 
Department of State’s Large Scale International Boundary Lines and World Vector Shorelines 
(LSIB-WVS) dataset. The Department of State’s Humanitarian Information Unit considers this 
dataset to be “to be the most accurate worldwide international boundary vector line file 
available.” ( Department of State, 2016) Of course, the recognition of states themselves is largely 
subjective and the LSIB-WVS reflects the foreign policy of the United States, which revolves 
around both the “facts on the ground” and US opportunism. Unfortunately, due to the lack of a 
more objective dataset that is as exceptional as the LSIB-WVS, our research will have a natural 
US bias. 
 To transform and construct the LSIB-
WVS for my dataset, I used ArcGIS Pro, 
developed by Esri. Within ArcGIS, each state 
boundary was transformed into its convex hull, 
which is defined as “a set of points S in n 
dimensions is the intersection of all convex sets 
containing S. " (He & Petoukhov, 2011)  In more 
simple terms, the convex hull is the shape that 
you receive when you stretch a rubber band around collection of points. The primary reason for 
this transformation is fragmented states; with fragmented states, Richardson’s compactness 
would not control for the distance between the landmasses of fragmented states – states like 
Kiribati, an island state in the heart of the Pacific, which is spread over thousands of kilometers. 
When analyzing Kiribati, Richardson’s compactness would essentially describe it as if all the 
Figure 2: The convex hull of a figure 
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islands composing the states were separated by an infinitesimally distance and as if they had an 
infinitesimal land bridge connects each island. This would be a poor way to codify states when 
we are attempting to understand, essentially, how distance from a capital effects insurgency.  
 To prevent insignificant landmass from dramatically misrepresenting a state’s convex 
hull, I removed any landmasses that failed to account for less than one percent of state’s 
landmass – for instance, Guam, the Aleutians, and the various Polynesian islands under the 
tutelage of the United States are not included. Further, any territory that was deemed by the U.S. 
Department of State, in the LSIB-WVS, to be autonomous was also disregarded, regardless of 
claim. Despite the fact that these territories are not considered to be states by the international 
system, they are administered locally and, thus, distort the conceptual gradient of political power 
that is at the center of this paper; Greenland, the British Overseas Territories, and Taiwan would 
all fall under this umbrella. 
 To calculate the locations of each state’s capital, I chose Natural Earth’s Populated Places 
dataset. Primary among the reasons for choosing the work of Natural Earth is its pedigree; it’s 
maintained by a host of cartographers hailing from world renown entities like Apple, the 
Washington Post, the United States National Park Service, the University of Wisconsin, and 
more; additionally, National Earth’s work has been featured in the aforementioned Washington 
Post, in addition to well-known publications like the Atlantic and WIRED. (Natural Earth, 2016) 
Finally, the dataset has an acceptable resolution at 1:10m and naturally compatible with the 
ArcGIS software that I used to produce the final dataset; this dataset was further verified for 
accuracy against the ESRI’s topographical layer. Finally, when any state had more than one 
capital, the capital that hosted the state executive was chosen – for instance, I chose Pretoria to 
represent South Africa. 
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 Using the convex hull of each state’s borders and the location of their capital, I was able 
to produce a capital centrality score. This simple measure is represented by the following 
equation: 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 1 − (
𝑐
𝑏
) 
In this equation, c is equal to the distance of the capital from the centroid and b is equal to the 
distance of the farthest land border or coastline to the centroid – the least central possible 
location for a capital. This equation allows us to, first, score the centrality of the capital on a 
scale of 0 to 1, with 0 being the least central and 1 being the most central and, second, allows us 
to “normalize” the location of each capital; it would be unfair, given our hypothesis to consider 
the Russian capital of Moscow to be more isolated than the Swedish capital of Stockholm, 
despite the fact that Moscow is approximately 3,000 miles farther from Russia’s centroid than 
Stockholm is from Sweden’s centroid – this is, of course, due to the fact that Russia is much 
larger than Sweden. Simply put, we are not measure physical distance nor the size of the size, but 
rather it’s geometric features. 
For my insurgency dataset, I have selected Max Boot’s “Invisible Armies Insurgency 
Tracker.” (2013) A myriad of exceptional datasets exists for insurgency, but I contend that they 
have significant problems for analysis. Boot writes “Many databases include only conflicts that 
pass a certain threshold, such as inflicting over one thousand battle deaths. This excludes groups 
such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Baader-Meinhof Gang, and produces bias in favor of 
insurgents—just as a study of start-up companies would be biased in favor of entrepreneurs if it 
were limited to only those firms that achieved a certain revenue threshold or stock price. Most 
start-ups, like most insurgent groups, never get very far, and this fact needs to be recorded.” 
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(ibid) It is for this reason that I avoid the two most noteworthy datasets, the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP) and the Correlates of War (CoW) project.  
 For the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, this is somewhat ironic, since it was created to 
mitigate the author’s criticisms of the CoW project; the creators, Gleditsch et al (2001) , explain 
in their introduction of the UCDP that the CoW’s minimum of 1,000 annual battle related death, 
is simply too substantial for a worthwhile analysis of insurgency. For example, the well-known 
separatist insurgencies in the Basque region of Spain do not make the CoW dataset, nor does the 
Northern Ireland insurgency conducted by the Irish Revolutionary Army, despite the fact these 
insurgencies have resulted in the deaths of thousands. (Government of Spain, 2013; The 
Guardian, 2010) More reasonably, the UCDP datasets that are relevant to insurgency (the UCDP 
One-sided Violence Dataset and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset) lists 25 deaths in one 
calendar year as the minimum criteria to be considered an armed conflict. 
While both are excellent datasets, even the UCDP is too high for our analysis. To 
illustrate this, let’s examine the Khalistan Sikh insurgency in India, which is included in the 
Invisible Armies dataset from 1984 through the last data at the end of 2012 but is largely absent 
from the UCDP dataset (it is included in 89-93 of both UCDP dataset, excluding 1991, of the 
One-sided Violence Dataset). (Melander, Pettersson, & Themnér, 2016) In “The Sikh Separatist 
Insurgency in India: Political Leadership and Ethnonationalist Movements,” Jugdep Chima 
(2010) illustrates that the Sikh insurgency was underway by 1984 and continued until a unified 
India effectively “destroyed” the insurgency in 1997.  However, many of the Sikh separatist 
groups, including the infamous Babbar Khalsa, continued to be well funded through at least 2012 
and still showcase the ability to carry out intricate attacks. (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2012) 
This meets Boot’s argument for inclusion in his Invisible Armies dataset, the criteria for which is, 
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in conjunction with the definition of insurgency that we established for Boot, “they caused some 
deaths and drew some attention from contemporaries and historians.” (Boot, Invisible Armies 
Insurgency Tracker, 2013) 
Many scholars would argue that this is too loose, but I disagree. Boot’s criteria matched 
all the definitions discussed above. More importantly, I argue that a more inclusive dataset 
means that we can more accurately measure the intense feelings of dissatisfaction that produces 
the conditions necessary for insurgency and the true trajectory of an insurgency. Indeed, an air of 
subjectivity plagues this criterion, but that air remains in other datasets; for example, the authors 
of the CoW subjectively consider anything under 25 deaths per year to be an unimportant to the 
story of an insurgency. However, the Babbar Khalsa clearly demonstrates that this is not the 
case. 
Within Boot’s dataset, I will examine a section beginning in the year 1970 and ending in 
2012, three months before LSIB-WVS was published. 1970 was chosen primarily to keep issues 
from shifting borders at a minimum, although Boot does account for some changes in the 
international system. For instance, the insurgencies in former Soviet Republics during Soviet Era 
are counted under the states that grew out of them, not under the Soviet Union or Russia. 
However, Boot’s dataset is both more simplistic and probably not as well maintained as CoW 
and UCDP; even if it was, it would be difficult for Boot to ascertain all the boundary changes in 
an extended time period. 
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RESEARCH  
VISUALIZING THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
To enhance our discussion on state geometry, it is important that we discuss that how the 
state system looks. First and foremost, the mean compactness was a relatively high .8583, 
indicating that Vanzo’s assertion that states seek compactness has some merit. Further, on a  
regional level, the Europe had, by far the highest compactness, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The state with the lowest compactness was Mali, an island state in the Indian Ocean, at .35, 
followed by another archipelago state, Mauritius at .39; 
no other state fell below .5. The least compact non-island 
state was, unsurprisingly, Chile, which maintains a 
compactness of approximately .57. The most compact 
states were dominated by island states, Nauru and 
REGION MEAN COMPACT  
EAsiaPac .80143094 
Europe .89452311 
Latin Am .83983197 
MidEastNAfr .86703549 
NorAmerica .8616038 
SoAsia .81344584 
SubSaAfr .87089581 
Figure 3: Convex Hulls of States with lines showing distance from capital to centroid 
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Suriname, with .971 and .97 
respectively, followed Sierra Leone at 
.97. The mean compactness is best 
represented by European state Albania, 
as seen in Figure 3. 
 
 For our capital centrality 
score, we found the mean to be .555; 
on a regional level, North America had the least 
centralized set of capitals at .38 and Southern Asia had 
the most centralized capitals at .63. The least centralized 
capitals were South Tarawa (.28) of Kiribati, a large 
archipelago state, and Porto Novo (.0289) of Benin, a 
small West African state.  
The most central capital was 
Spain’s Madrid, which 
scored .982. The mean 
capital centrality score is 
almost exactly that of North 
Korea’s Pyongyang, which 
is represented in Figure 4 
Moving on to 
insurgency, the average state  
REGION  MEAN CAP CENT 
EAsiaPac  .54255645 
Europe  .60724674 
Latin Am  .60049238 
MidEastNAfr  .53135561 
NorAmerica  .37892659 
SoAsia  .63089333 
SubSaAfr  .47895085 
Figure 4: Albania's Convex Hull 
Figure 5: North Korea convex hull with line that ascends from capital to centroid 
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experienced approximately 3,754 days, just over 10 years, of insurgency in the 43 period that we 
examined. By region, Southern Asia (7753 days) and Middle East/North Africa (6764 days) 
regions, unsurprisingly, had by far the highest mean insurgency 
while Latin America (1843 days) and Europe (2045 days) had the 
lowest. 105 states felt no insurgency over the course of the 43-
year period while 11 experienced insurgencies from beginning to 
end. The 3725 days of insurgency in Nepal is just 30 days below 
the mean days of insurgency and best represents cases in real terms.  
RESULTS 
I begin by testing the relationship of Richardson’s compactness and the number of days 
of insurgency as a universal principle by calculating the Spearman’s r between the two variable 
for the entire dataset. Spearman’s r finds a small relationship between the two with a mid-level 
significance, but the relationship is rather surprising, as states become more compact, they see 
more days of 
insurgency. Indeed, 
scrutiny of the 
quadratic scatterplot 
also detects a similar 
relationship between 
the two variables and 
potentially reveals 
some more  
REGION MEAN INSDAY 
EAP 3591.0917 
ECA 2045.434 
LAC 1843.8047 
MENA 6764.275 
NA 5864.25 
SAS 7753.25 
SSA 4905.266 
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interesting associations. A cursory 
examination shows that insurgency 
contends that many states with low 
compactness have had no insurgency. 
Indeed, a cross-tabulation of our 
variables (insurgency days grouped 
into 0 and then, roughly, thirds) 
confirms this; nearly three-fourths of the lowest quartile (least compact) had no insurgency while 
over half of the highest quartile experienced the most occurrences of insurgency. To better 
understand what variables may be at play, I dissected each quartile to their component parts – the 
states themselves; additionally, seeking some geopolitical clarity, I have sorted them by region as 
well.  
For the lowest quartile, we notice an interesting set of circumstances; first, only one 
nation, Japan, has had insurgency the entire length of our dataset (15705 days) while 4 states of 
the most compact quartile reached the maximum. Further, the least compact states are dominated 
by Latin America, East Asia/Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa, while the most compact states are 
dominated by our Europe/Central Asia and Sub-Saharan African regions. In the former, only 
four of the fourteen East Asian and Pacific and two of the Latin American countries; in the latter, 
only six of the seventeen Europe/Central Asia felt insurgency. Perhaps the most interesting 
portion of these samples is the vast gulf between the Sub-Saharan African states – of the least 
compact, only two, Eritrea and Somalia had insurgency while the vast majority of the most 
compact states saw insurgency. 
 
Insurg Leng 
(in days) 
Compactness Quartiles 
  1 2 3 4 Total 
0 34 24 25 22 105 
1 to 5000 4 9 8 9 30 
5000 to 10k 4 6 3 11 24 
10k+ 6 10 12 7 35 
Total 48 49 48 49 194 
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Least Compact States Most Compact States 
NAME REGION COMP INS DAYS NAME REGION RCOMP INS DAYS 
PALAU EAP 0.5715838 0 CAMBODIA EAP 0.936853 8521 
VANUATU EAP 0.5953622 0 CHINA EAP 0.9367214 6209.25 
TUVALU EAP 0.6499221 0 AUSTRALIA EAP 0.950361 0 
MICRONESIA EAP 0.6762864 0 NAURU EAP 0.9716881 0 
SOL ISLANDS EAP 0.6998177 0 IRELAND ECA 0.9273452 15705.75 
SAMOA EAP 0.7047136 0 GREECE ECA 0.9401944 13523.5 
TONGA EAP 0.7134202 0 GERMANY ECA 0.9508006 10131 
KIRIBATI EAP 0.7375472 0 ITALY ECA 0.9238437 6697 
MALAYSIA EAP 0.784761 0 AZERBAIJAN ECA 0.9566443 2296 
NEW ZEALAND EAP 0.8038831 0 KOSOVO ECA 0.9449804 1225 
VIETNAM EAP 0.823025 1945 MONTENEGRO ECA 0.9230901 0 
TIMOR-LESTE EAP 0.6676833 8675 SWITZERLAND ECA 0.9277034 0 
INDONESIA EAP 0.7207657 13992 LUXEMBOURG ECA 0.9303238 0 
JAPAN EAP 0.7579481 15705.25 UKRAINE ECA 0.9341243 0 
NORWAY ECA 0.7707405 0 ANDORRA ECA 0.9456759 0 
MONACO ECA 0.780696 0 ROMANIA ECA 0.9458795 0 
SWEDEN ECA 0.7818862 0 ICELAND ECA 0.9470612 0 
CYPRUS ECA 0.801488 0 BELARUS ECA 0.9481414 0 
GEORGIA ECA 0.7980127 474 LITHUANIA ECA 0.951363 0 
GRENADA LAC 0.6597767 0 POLAND ECA 0.958058 0 
SAINT VINCENT  LAC 0.6766999 0 MACEDONIA ECA 0.9638886 0 
CUBA LAC 0.6819872 0 GUATEMALA LAC 0.9495259 9831 
SAINT KITTS LAC 0.7436563 0 COLOMBIA LAC 0.9283166 5753.5 
ANTIGUA LAC 0.7482978 0 URUGUAY LAC 0.9461528 1247 
ECUADOR LAC 0.7490895 0 BRAZIL LAC 0.9376448 608 
THE BAHAMAS LAC 0.7772456 0 VENEZUELA LAC 0.9311304 0 
TRINIDAD/TOB LAC 0.7911483 0 BOLIVIA LAC 0.9315459 0 
JAMAICA LAC 0.7958875 0 SURINAME LAC 0.9610303 0 
BELIZE LAC 0.8078475 0 ALGERIA MENA 0.9319276 7670.75 
ARGENTINA LAC 0.8078506 2304 DJIBOUTI MENA 0.9303797 3572 
CHILE LAC 0.5669199 15706 CANADA NA 0.929886 365 
BAHRAIN MENA 0.7575617 0 ANGOLA SSA 0.9292182 15705.5 
MALTA MENA 0.7841895 0 NIGERIA SSA 0.9374197 15705.5 
ISRAEL MENA 0.6810262 9163 SUDAN SSA 0.9479228 15705.5 
MOROCCO MENA 0.8213747 13457.75 BURUNDI SSA 0.9261059 12036 
LEBANON MENA 0.8124586 13777.5 RWANDA SSA 0.9326709 8127 
MEXICO NA 0.8105982 6939.75 SOUTH AFRICA SSA 0.9398532 7517 
MALDIVES SAS 0.35617 0 ETHIOPIA SSA 0.933226 6025 
NEPAL SAS 0.7824017 3725 KENYA SSA 0.9245222 5478.75 
MAURITIUS SSA 0.3978938 0 TANZANIA SSA 0.9425202 5478.75 
SAO TOME/PRIN SSA 0.5243514 0 COTE D'IVOIRE SSA 0.9478596 4017.75 
SEYCHELLES SSA 0.6655912 0 SIERRA LEONE SSA 0.9700406 3959 
THE GAMBIA SSA 0.67812 0 ZIMBABWE SSA 0.9478352 3621 
TOGO SSA 0.7424322 0 BOTSWANA SSA 0.9249292 0 
MALAWI SSA 0.7733465 0 ZAMBIA SSA 0.9393841 0 
MADAGASCAR SSA 0.8225556 0 MAURITANIA SSA 0.9396764 0 
ERITREA SSA 0.8027251 8544 SWAZILAND SSA 0.9517629 0 
SOMALIA SSA 0.8184217 11871.5 LESOTHO SSA 0.9526561 0 
    
GABON SSA 0.9703525 0 
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Why are these more compact states seeing so much more insurgency? I posit that it’s 
more so related to size than compactness. Examining the Sub-Saharan African states specifically, 
the mean area of the most compact states is dramatically larger than those of least compact 
states. Indeed, when testing our entire dataset for a correlation between days of insurgency and 
physical size, Spearman’s r found a .28 correlation with a p value of less than .01 when testing 
the real area of the state against insurgency days. To add another wrinkle to this relationship, I 
also found a .33 correlation with a p-value of less than 0.0001 when testing the relationship 
between compactness and the area of a state. 
 What does this mean when it’s all put together? We have marginal, if any, that 
compactness prevents insurgency, however, we do have significant correlations between the area 
of a state and its compactness, lending credence to Vanzo, who suggested that states seek to 
become more compact, and Branch, who suggests that states are compact because compactness 
feels right. Further, as states grow, my data suggests that, as states get larger, they experience 
more insurgency. Thus, it may be that states are trying to become more compact and, in the 
process, risking their government and the rights of their citizens; still, more research is needed. 
Regarding my second hypothesis, although we have found no correlation that suggests 
that compactness has an effect on the number of days of 
insurgency, we can still examine how the centrality of 
borders can affect the number of days of insurgency. An 
examination of each group of insurgency days reveals that it does seem to have some 
relationship with capital centrality score; however, it is not a negative relationship – there’s a 
Insurg Days) Mean CapCentScore 
0 .53341082 
1 to 5000 .5399959 
5000 to 10k .57937087 
10k+ .61474955 
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distinct positive trend. Although, this does seem counterintuitive, I find there’s a very simple 
explanation.  
First, analysis using Spearman’s r finds a low significance between the two variables, 
demonstrating that this trend is the result of another variable. Further, as with our relationship 
between insurgency and compactness, Spearman’s r does find high significance (with a p value 
of .0001) in a positive relationship (.28) between distance and days of insurgency. Further, 
adding area and physical distance to the examination of each group of insurgency days, sans 
Russia – a massive outlier in the third group, supports the suggestion that physical space has a 
much greater effect on insurgency. Therefore, when we put this all together, my data indicates 
that, as states grow, repositioning political power has little ability to mitigate the potential 
negative effects of that growth.  
Insurg Leng (in days) Mean CapCentScore Mean CapToCent (km) Mean Area (km2) 
0 .53341082 196.10836 255122.12 
1 to 5000 .5399959 314.79438 978166.08 
5000 to 10k .59638843 334.10296 1066742.6 
10k+ .61474955 395.15401 980002.38 
 
CONCLUSION 
My findings lend support to Vanzo’s assertion that states seek compactness as they grow 
and Branch’s assertions that other factors are much more important in the state building equation 
and producing compact states just because compact feel right is, obviously, a very poor strategy. 
More clearly, my interpretation of my data suggests the following story: when states look to 
grow, they choose territory that makes said state more compact, because, as Branch suggests, it 
feels correct. Yet, conversely, there seems to be little “correctness” in this choice and further, 
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that growth may put the government and people of that state at greater risk. When looking for 
solutions to this problem, a state may look to reposition their capital to a more central location, 
as Gottman suggests, but there is little support for this solution in my data.  
However, beyond this, there is much more to be examined on this topic, even with in the 
field of asymmetric warfare. Future research should focus on expanding the number of years 
included in the data, despite the difficulty that the large amount of territorial reconfigurations in 
the international system grants the task. In doing this we may be able to discover a longer term 
trend and better understand if compactness or the emphasis on it is truly related to the failure of 
these states; if this is the case, there may be a need to “redraw the map of Africa,” as Matua 
suggests, albeit in a much different way than my hypotheses suggested. Moreover, other datasets 
and methods should be used to review this problem, as both those of mine have various 
weaknesses; for example, calculating the convex hull necessitated removing some politically 
relevant territory, such as the Hawaiian Islands. 
Moreover, our results should not be taken to invalidate the work of the other authors 
included in this paper, our measures had key differences with much of the research reviewed. For 
example, the work of Buhaug and the World Bank focuses much more on the physical space 
where this work focuses much more on the geometric shapes and the normalized distance of 
political power. Indeed, my cursory examination of the days of insurgency with variables of 
physical area and distance from capital to centroid yield significant positive correlations. 
Still, as other scholars have mentioned, state geometry is underexplored in many other 
areas of Political Science. As I demonstrated in the case of our ellipse, elongated states are 
inefficient in a vacuum and the costs of compactness may manifest their selves in other ways; for 
example, increased refugee flows, increased costs of government, decreased economic growth, 
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less favorable defense outcomes, among others. Thus, the potential application of this research 
would greatly override the highly complex methods necessitated by the endeavor; but it is 
complex, nonetheless - even Lewis Richardson, a ground-breaking mathematician, was frustrated 
by the complexity of the issue. (Richardson, 1961) Yet, with the continuous introduction of an 
incredible wealth of tools and datasets, we are moving ever closer to completing Richardson’s 
work. 
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